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Abstract:  
The classification of mental illness—enshrined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM)—has historically followed a categorial model of disorder. However, in 
light of psychiatry’s failure to validate the DSM categories, psychiatrists have developed 
dimensional models for understanding and classifying disorders, such as the National Institute of 
Mental Health’s Research Domain Criteria initiative (RDoC). While some philosophers have 
recently contributed to the literature on dimensional approaches to psychiatric research and 
classification, no sustained engagement has yet been offered by continental phenomenologists. In 
this article, I argue that phenomenological research can benefit from a broadly dimensional 
orientation—albeit one that differs in many respects from the RDoC. Developing this argument, 
I motivate, outline, and illustrate a phenomenological-dimensional approach. In so doing, I show 
how a dimensional orientation can circumvent problems stemming from the use of current 
diagnostic categories as a guide to psychiatric research. In addition, I argue that a dimensional 
orientation need not conflict with more traditional phenomenological approaches, such as the 
core gestalt model, and can even complement and support such approaches. 
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Introduction: The Crisis of Contemporary Psychiatry 
 Contemporary psychiatry finds itself in the midst of a crisis of classification. The 
developments begun in the 1980s—with the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III)—successfully increased inter-rater reliability (i.e. the 
likelihood of two or more clinicians arriving at the same diagnosis for the same patient). 
However, these developments have done little to increase the predictive validity of our categories 
of disorder. A diagnosis based on DSM categories and criteria often fails to accurately anticipate 
course of illness or treatment response. In addition, there is little evidence that the DSM 
categories link up with genetic findings, and even less evidence that they correlate with distinct 
neurobiological states (St. Stoyanov, Borgwardt, & Varga, 2015). 
 Some argue that the lack of neurobiological correlates is evidence that psychiatric 
disorders are not brain disorders, but are instead problems of living (Szasz, 1960). Others argue 
that the lack of validity is evidence that these particular categories are poorly delineated—if we 
carved up the categories of mental disorder differently, we might make more accurate predictions 
and discover distinct biomarkers (Malhi, Parker, & Greenwood, 2005). 
 While both of these approaches have received attention in the psychiatric literature, much 
of the current debate hinges not on whether our current categories are valid, but on whether a 
categorial approach in general is capable of accurately articulating the domain of mental illness. 
Prominent figures at the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), such as Insel and Cuthbert, 
argue that the best way to approach current problems in psychiatric classification—at least from 
a research perspective—is to give up categories and turn toward dimensions (Cuthbert & Insel, 
2013; Cuthbert & Kozak, 2013). Rather than beginning from distinct kinds of illness, we should 
begin from distinct features of human behavior, experience, and brain circuitry. From these core 
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features, we can study the full range of normal to abnormal phenomena, without being beholden 
to the still unjustified belief that mental disorders group into more or less distinct categories. 
 Philosophers have made considerable contributions to our understanding of the 
classification of mental disorders (Kincaid & Sullivan, 2014; Zachar, Stoyanov, Aragona, & 
Jablensky, 2015), including dimensional approaches to classification (Murphy, 2015; Schaffner, 
2012). The contribution that I make here also concerns these developments. However, unlike 
most contributors to the current literature on the topic, my concern is with the role of continental 
phenomenology in dimensional approaches to psychiatric classification. I argue that, in spite of 
phenomenology’s historical alignment with categorial approaches to the understanding and 
classification of psychiatric disorders, it is well suited to developing research programs along 
dimensional lines. 
 My project is developed in four parts. First, I distinguish categorial from dimensional 
models of disorder and I clarify the sense of dimensionality that I am concerned with. Second, I 
outline the phenomenological contributions to the philosophical literature on psychiatric 
classification and argue that this work does not adequately address dimensional approaches 
because of phenomenology’s traditional orientation toward typification. Third, I motivate, 
outline, and illustrate a phenomenological-dimensional approach to psychiatric research and 
classification (drawing inspiration from the NIMH’s Research Domain Criteria initiative 
(RDoC)). Fourth, and finally, I argue that a dimensional approach to phenomenological research 
can complement the trouble générateur or core gestalt approach employed by contemporary 
phenomenological psychopathologists such as Parnas and Sass. 
Categorial and Dimensional Approaches to Psychiatric Classification 
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 Before considering the possibility of a phenomenological-dimensional approach to 
classifying mental disorders, it will be helpful to clarify the kind of dimensional approach that I 
am concerned with, and how it differs from more traditional categorial approaches. The major 
diagnostic manuals assume that the kinds of phenomena studied and treated by psychiatrists are 
amenable to discrimination—that is, more or less definite lines can be drawn not only between 
normality and psychopathology, but also among the various kinds of psychopathological 
conditions (Tabb, 2015). This assumption is not necessarily essentialist; it does not require that 
absolutely clear boundaries can be drawn in all cases (Kincaid & Sullivan, 2014). However, it at 
least requires that we have more or less discrete entities, even if these entities have fuzzy 
boundaries or are better categorized through family resemblances (e.g. shared property clusters) 
rather than absolutely essential features (Haslam, 2014; Zachar, 2014). 
 Proponents of “dimensional” approaches have recently challenged categorial dominance. 
However, there are two fundamentally different kinds of dimensional approaches that are not 
always disambiguated in the literature. One dimensional approach—a major topic of discussion 
in the decade preceding the publication of the DSM-5 (2013)—aims to supplement (rather than 
undermine and replace) categories with dimensions (see Helzer et al., 2008). This approach was 
taken up in the DSM-5, leading to broad and explicitly heterogeneous categories such as autism 
spectrum disorder.  
Another dimensional approach that recently entered into scientific and philosophical 
discourse aims to undermine and replace (rather than supplement) categories with dimensions. 
On this new dimensional approach, the phenomena that vary in degree, or exist along a 
continuum, are core features of human beings—behavioral, experiential, or neurobiological. 
Such features might include attention, visual perception, agency, or even the understanding of 
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others’ mental states (Cuthbert & Insel, 2013; Cuthbert & Kozak, 2013; “Research domain 
criteria matrix,” n.d.). 
The distinction between these approaches hinges on the kind of phenomena the 
dimensions belong to. The former approach focuses on dimensions of categories of disorder. It 
posits that the domain of mental disorder is amenable to categorization, but concedes that there 
are no hard boundaries between health and illness, or between various disordered conditions. The 
latter approach focuses on dimensions of human behavior, experience, and neurobiology. It 
therefore dispenses with categories of mental disorder entirely. 
I reserve the term “dimensional” for this latter approach, which is the one I am concerned 
with here. I refer to the former approach as “spectral,” drawing on its use in the development of 
broad categories such as autism spectrum disorder. 
Contemporary Phenomenological Approaches to Psychiatric Classification 
 Most phenomenological psychopathologists are critical of the diagnostic criteria as well 
as the categories of disorder currently in use. Parnas and Bovet criticize the superficiality of 
operationalism, which is the diagnostic approach employed since the DSM-III (Parnas & Bovet, 
2015). Stanghellini argues that many of the diagnostic criteria are poorly defined, offering us 
vague and problematically heterogeneous accounts of what actually constitutes each disorder 
(Stanghellini, 2004). Ratcliffe and his colleagues have pointed out that some of the categories are 
so broad that they include somatic disorders, such as inflammation (Ratcliffe, Broome, Smith, & 
Bowden, 2013). However, in spite of the critical stance toward both the diagnostic criteria and 
the particular diagnostic categories currently in use, phenomenologists tend to be sympathetic 
toward—if not overtly supportive of—a categorial approach to classification. 
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 The phenomenological orientation toward categorial approaches to research and 
classification has a long history, but its contemporary manifestation owes much to Schwartz and 
Wiggins’ early work on typification (1985, 1987). Drawing on the work of Husserl (1973), 
Schutz (1966), and Polanyi (1966), they argue that our everyday manner of understanding and 
perceiving objects within the world (including other embodied subjects) is grounded in a process 
of typification. That is, we experience things as belonging to a certain type, or kind. These types 
need not be explicitly defined or clearly delineated; they constitute a tacit, passive background 
through which we perceive and understand our world.1 
 In light of this account of sense-making, phenomenologists tend to be critical of 
classificatory systems that ignore this intuitive mode of understanding. Operationalism receives 
the brunt of this criticism because it not only dispenses with any kind of intuitive understanding, 
but also seeks to replace this understanding with superficial lists of easily observable symptoms 
that do not hang together in any meaningful structure. The operational approach fails to 
acknowledge how psychiatrists (and human beings in general) understand, classify, and make 
sense of their world. These phenomenologists argue that when classifying a new domain, we 
would do well to make our system of classification mirror or mimic our everyday ways of 
understanding phenomena. Psychiatric classification and diagnosis should be developed through 
an enhanced or scientifically supplemented process of typification that we already employ in 
everyday life (Wiggins & Schwartz, 1994).  
This outlook has been developed along two different lines, referred to as the ideal type 
approach and the prototype approach. Schwartz, Wiggins, and Norko (1989, 1995) propose an 
ideal types approach to diagnosis and classification. An ideal type (as defined in the work of 
Weber (2011) and Jaspers (1997)), is a heuristic concept that outlines the basic features of the 
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phenomenon in question. Much like the relation between geometric concepts and their material 
manifestations, there need not be any real instances of the type in its ideal form. Nevertheless, 
the ideal type offers a clear starting point whereby a community of researchers and clinicians can 
orient their investigations. Because it is understood that a pure instance of the type may not exist, 
the concept casts a wide net, allowing researchers and clinicians to categorize a subject’s 
condition while also stipulating how this particular manifestation diverges from the ideal type in 
question. 
Parnas and Gallagher, by contrast, have most recently advocated a prototype approach to 
psychiatric classification (2015).2 Much like ideal types, prototyping acknowledges the inherent 
fuzziness in the boundaries between psychiatric disorders. Rather than offering essential criteria 
for diagnosis, the prototype approach begins with an exemplar—one that stands as the best 
representative of a certain class. They use the analogy of taking a sparrow, rather than a penguin 
or an ostrich, as the prototype for the category “bird.” While penguins and ostriches are certainly 
birds, they fail to exhibit a number of features typically associated with birds (e.g. flying), while 
exhibiting a number of features not typically associated with birds (e.g. efficient locomotion in 
water or on land). As a result, these birds are poor prototypical representatives of the class 
“birds”—in many respects they are the exception rather than the rule. Parnas and Gallagher 
argue that we should approach the classification of mental disorders in much the same way, 
carefully selecting the prototypical representatives of each category (2015, pp. 75–76). The 
primary point of differentiation between the ideal type and prototype approaches is that the 
former anchors its concept in an ideal (and not necessarily real) phenomenon, while the latter 
anchors its concept in an actual instance of the condition in question. 
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These approaches offer a corrective to the operational program in which psychiatrists 
diagnose through structured interviews and symptom checklists—which, as the above authors 
have pointed out, are not followed by most clinicians. However, insofar as these 
phenomenological approaches are founded on the process of typification, they are necessarily 
aligned with categorial classifications, and it remains unclear whether and how phenomenology 
can engage in dimensionally oriented research and classification. In the following two sections I 
develop an initial outline of a phenomenological-dimensional approach and argue that this kind 
of approach need not conflict with more traditional approaches to phenomenological 
psychopathology. 
A Phenomenological-Dimensional Approach to Psychiatric Research and Classification 
In light of phenomenology’s traditional orientation toward typification and categorial 
classification, I need to justify my aim of articulating a phenomenological-dimensional approach. 
The most compelling reason for developing a dimensional outlook hinges on the distinction 
between diagnostic and research classifications. The DSM, originally developed for use in 
diagnosis, became the de facto standard by which subjects are selected for research. As a result, 
it became nearly impossible to design studies that test and challenge the validity of current 
diagnostic categories; the legitimacy of the DSM categories is necessarily presumed in the 
construction of the study, producing a vicious circularity at the heart of psychiatric research. 
The negative consequences of employing the same categorial classification in both 
diagnosis and research prompted dimensional approaches, such as the Research Domain Criteria 
initiative (RDoC). This kind of approach relieves the question-begging constraints that arise 
when preliminary diagnostic categories delimit the populations employed in research studies. 
Current diagnostic categories are bracketed or put out of play, and psychopathological research is 
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oriented through basic features of human existence. A dimensional approach supplies a 
fundamentally different orientation by which to explore mental health and illness—one that cuts 
across current diagnostic boundaries and spans the health-illness spectrum. 
In the following subsections, I 1) introduce the NIMH’s RDoC initiative as an example of 
a dimensional framework, 2) outline a phenomenological-dimensional approach, and 3) illustrate 
this approach by drawing on recent work by Sass and Pienkos (2013) and Ratcliffe (2012). 
A Contemporary Dimensional Approach: The RDoC 
 While there are numerous ways to frame a phenomenological-dimensional approach, my 
proposal is roughly guided by the RDoC insofar as it begins from a set of domains, each 
containing dimensions, or constructs (the two terms are used interchangeably). The current 
version of the RDoC divides its domains into 1) Negative Valence Systems; 2) Positive Valence 
Systems; 3) Cognitive Systems; 4) Systems for Social Processes; and 5) Arousal/Regulatory 
Systems (for definitions, see “NIMH » Development and definitions of the RDoC domains and 
constructs,” n.d.). Each domain captures a broad range of human behavior, experience, and 
biology, which is refined through a set of constructs and sub-constructs. Systems for Social 
Processes, for example, include the constructs of 1) Affiliation and Attachment; 2) Social 
Communication; 3) Perception and Understanding of Self; and 4) Perception and Understanding 
of Others. Of these, all except the first include additional sub-constructs. Perception and 
Understanding of Self, for instance, includes the sub-constructs of 1) Agency and 2) Self-
Knowledge. Perception and Understanding of Others, by contrast, includes the sub-constructs of 
1) Animacy Perception, 2) Action Perception, and 3) Understanding Mental States. These 
divisions, however, are not set in stone—the NIMH encourages research proposals that 
investigate new constructs or refine current constructs. 
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 When a new study is proposed within the RDoC framework, its primary orientation is 
defined by the construct or sub-construct in question (rather than a category of disorder). By 
orienting the study along these dimensional lines, researchers are able to study this particular 
dimension of human consciousness across various psychopathological conditions, or across the 
health-illness spectrum. 
Outlining a Phenomenological-Dimensional Approach 
 In drawing on the RDoC I am not proposing that phenomenologists attempt to make their 
own approach consistent with the RDoC matrix (i.e. its set of domains, constructs, and sub-
constructs). Rather, in appealing to the RDoC model as a fairly robust dimensional—rather than 
categorial—approach to psychiatric research and classification, I aim to adapt a broad 
domain/construct framework for use in phenomenological research. 
 To begin, it is immediately apparent that phenomenologists do not distinguish or 
delineate the constitutive features of human subjectivity in a manner analogous to the RDoC 
domains. However, most phenomenologists do rely on a shared set of conceptual distinctions to 
guide their investigations of human subjectivity. These concepts are what Heidegger refers to as 
“existentials” (1962), although they are also referred to as “transcendental,” “essential,” or 
“ontological” structures (Fernandez, 2014; forthcoming b). Each existential refers to a basic 
constitutive feature of human existence, including (but not limited to) selfhood, intersubjectivity, 
affectivity, understanding, temporality, spatiality, and intentionality.3 
 Because the distinctions among these existentials are largely uncontroversial, I propose 
that they stand as the domains of phenomenological-dimensional research. Selfhood, for 
example, can stand as a domain at the highest level, and might include the constructs of 1) Core 
Self and 2) Narrative Self. Within the Core Self, we can include a set of sub-constructs. Drawing 
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on the Examination of Anomalous Experience (EASE), these constructs might include 1) 
Cognition and Stream of Consciousness; 2) Self-Awareness and Presence; 3) Bodily 
Experiences; 4) Demarcation/Transitivism (of the self-world boundary); and 5) Existential 
Orientation (with respect to metaphysical worldview and/or hierarchy of values) (Parnas et al., 
2005). 
 It is important that these dimensions are neutral with respect to health and illness. In 
order to provide phenomenologists with the tools to study the full range of healthy and 
psychopathological phenomena, the framework should not predetermine or otherwise limit the 
possibilities for these investigations. For this reason, the EASE does not in itself provide a 
dimensional framework of the kind I am proposing. The additional items and subtypes in the 
EASE are psychopathological phenomena, rather than basic features of human subjectivity. For 
example, Cognition and Stream of Consciousness includes items such as Thought Interference; 
Thought Pressure; and Perceptualization of Inner Speech or Thought. While these may be the 
kinds of psychopathological features that phenomenological psychopathologists investigate via a 
dimensional approach, the dimensional framework itself should not be oriented through these 
items. By limiting the domains and constructs to the basic features of human subjectivity, the 
framework remains applicable to broadest range of healthy and psychopathological conditions. 
Illustrating Phenomenological-Dimensional Investigations 
 In order to better clarify the kinds of investigations that can be developed within a 
phenomenological-dimensional approach, I consider two examples. These studies are not 
explicitly developed along the dimensional lines that I have proposed, but they do employ a 
broadly dimensional outlook, investigating the boundaries between and within current diagnostic 
categories. The first example is Sass and Pienkos’ (2013) study of selfhood across melancholia, 
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mania, and schizophrenia. The second is Ratcliffe’s (2012) study of temporality in major 
depressive disorder. With the first example, I show how a broadly dimensional approach 
provides an effective framework for comparing (apparently) similar features across different 
psychopathological conditions. With the second example, I show how focusing on one 
phenomenological domain, or existential, provides an effective framework for teasing apart the 
conditions enveloped within a single diagnostic category.  
 Sass and Pienkos take up items from the EASE, designed primarily for studies of 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders, but employ these items across a variety of psychopathological 
conditions, including those typically classed as affective disorders. In adopting this orientation, 
they still take for granted certain categorial distinctions, but the investigation itself is oriented 
through basic dimensions of human subjectivity. This orientation illuminates subtle distinctions 
among the dimensions of human subjectivity and the psychopathological changes these 
dimensions can undergo. 
 Sass and Pienkos’ investigation of the self-world boundary clearly illustrates their 
approach. They point out that the self-world boundary is sometimes increased in melancholia, 
while in mania (and especially psychotic mania) there can be a sense of mystic union with the 
world, severely diminishing “normal ego boundaries” (Sass & Pienkos, 2013, p. 124). This latter 
alteration of the self-world relation seems akin to conditions along the schizophrenia spectrum, 
where the boundary between self and world is also put into question. However, by attending to 
this specific dimension, they point out that subtle (yet important) differences remain. First, in 
mania the diminished self-world boundary is accompanied by an ecstatic or benign mood tone 
(the mood is neither frightening nor unpleasant) (Sass & Pienkos, 2013, p. 125). Second, the 
manic subject does not actually become confused about his own perspective or who he is, despite 
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his feeling of oneness with the world. In conditions on the schizophrenia spectrum, by contrast, 
the subject can become anxious about his own identity, feeling invaded by the outside world. In 
addition, the sense of unity is often accompanied by a kind of solipsism—the world is simply an 
extension of oneself, having no independent reality. Both cases involve a blurring of the self-
world boundary, but the boundary is blurred in fundamentally different ways. 
 Sass and Pienkos’ study, while preliminary and exploratory, offers substantial insight into 
both the similarities and differences across melancholic, manic, and schizophrenic experience. 
And it is precisely their dimensional orientation—beginning from core features of human 
existence rather than diagnostic categories (DSM or otherwise)—that allows them to explore 
these similarities and differences, drawing more fine-grained distinctions between 
psychopathological disturbances.  
 However, while Sass and Pienkos offer a careful analysis of dimensions of the Core Self 
across melancholia, mania, and schizophrenia, they do not use their approach to examine or tease 
apart the heterogeneity within current diagnostic categories. To see how a dimensional approach 
might highlight and tease apart the diverse conditions enveloped within a single diagnostic 
category, we can turn to Ratcliffe’s study of temporality in major depression. 
 It is common to characterize temporal experience in depression as a slowing down of 
perceived temporal duration or velocity. However, as Ratcliffe points out, this is a fairly limited 
and superficial characterization, at least when considered in the light of robust and detailed 
phenomenological analyses of the structural features of temporality (Ratcliffe, 2012). These 
features include, but are not limited to, Conative Momentum; the Protentional-Retentional 
Structure; Teleological Orientation vs. Cyclical Orientation; and Intersubjective Synchronicity, 
or the sense that “our experiences and activities are ordinarily temporally synchronized with 
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those of others” (Fuchs, 2013; Ratcliffe, 2012). Examining these distinct structural elements, 
Ratcliffe shows that while many conditions classed as MDD include a disturbance of temporal 
experience, the changes are not the same across all subjects meeting the criteria for this 
diagnosis. 
 Some subjects, for instance, undergo a partial or total loss of conative drive/momentum; 
possibilities do not appear as enticing or worth pursuing. Others experience a loss of some or all 
of one’s futural projects. Still others undergo a more profound change in which the significance 
that futural projects presuppose is itself absent. Some subjects undergo multiple changes in 
temporality simultaneously—e.g. loss of conative drive accompanied by loss of futural 
projects—while others undergo a temporal disturbance along a single dimension. 
 Like Sass and Pienkos’ study, Ratcliffe’s investigation is oriented first and foremost 
through a single domain, or existential—in this case, temporality. This domain is then subdivided 
into its distinct structural elements, or what I have referred to as constructs and sub-constructs. In 
so doing, Ratcliffe not only illuminates the heterogeneity of conditions enveloped by the 
category of MDD, he also offers a preliminary set of disturbances that might guide research 
aimed at subtyping MDD or further mapping the dimensions of human subjectivity. 
These kinds of investigations, whether they ultimately challenge or support current 
diagnostic boundaries, are made possible by employing a dimensional research framework—one 
that does not presume the legitimacy of our current diagnostic categories, instead providing a 
fundamentally new orientation for phenomenological investigations.  
Dimensions, Trouble Générateur, and the Core Gestalt 
 Having motivated, outlined, and illustrated a phenomenological-dimensional approach to 
psychiatric research and classification, my aim in this section is to clarify the relationship 
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between my proposal and a more traditional orientation of phenomenological research. The 
phenomenological psychopathologist, Minkowski, developed a phenomenological approach that 
uncovers the trouble générateur, or “generating disorder” (Minkowski, 1927). This genetic4 
orientation investigates 1) the general theme or organization of the psychopathological condition, 
and 2) the fundamental disturbance at the heart of the disorder, or the alteration that brings about 
or otherwise influences other aspects of the condition (Sass, 2014, p. 367). More recently, Parnas 
has developed this notion into what he calls the “core gestalt.” 
The notion of Gestalt refers to a salient unity or intrinsic organization of diverse 
phenomenal features, based on reciprocal part-whole interactions. In this framework, 
psychiatric symptoms and signs cannot be considered as mutually independent, atomic 
features that become individuated (i.e., identified as this or that particular symptom) “in 
themselves,” independently of their experiential context. (Parnas, 2012, p. 67) 
In this clarification, Parnas contrasts the core gestalt approach with approaches that characterize 
psychiatric disorders through clusters of atomistic symptoms. His critique is aimed at the 
operational approach mentioned above (i.e. the system of classification and diagnosis employed 
in the DSM). However, my dimensional proposal may fall into his line of criticism as well, at 
least insofar as it proceeds by distinguishing the diverse elements of human subjectivity, and 
using these distinctions as a framework for phenomenological research. 
 I argue, however, that my dimensional proposal need not conflict with, and can even 
complement, the traditional core gestalt approach. The phenomenological psychiatrist, 
Ellenberger, distinguished three approaches to phenomenological studies of psychopathology. 
He referred to these as the descriptive, genetic-structural, and categorical approaches. The first 
refers to Jaspers’ version of phenomenological psychopathology, which offers clear and 
 16 
systematic descriptions of lived experience. The second refers to the trouble générateur or core 
gestalt approach. And the third refers to the study of “categories of inner experience,” or what I 
refer to as existentials (Ellenberger, 1958, p. 101; Fernandez, forthcoming b). While Ellenberger 
portrays these as three distinct approaches, he does not claim that they are mutually exclusive. At 
different stages of investigation we may benefit from employing one kind of study or the other, 
and information we obtain in one kind of investigation may inform the conclusions of another. 
For example, while Minkowski employs the trouble générateur approach, Ellenberger points out 
that Minkwoski also made headway by orienting some of his investigations through a specific 
existential, such as spatiality or temporality, exploring how this particular aspect of human 
experience is altered or disturbed in the condition in question (Ellenberger, 1958, pp. 101–108). 
 While Ellenberger does not fully explore the possibility of mutually informative 
investigations across these approaches, I here want to sketch some avenues for complementary 
research in phenomenological psychopathology. First, if phenomenologists aim to uncover the 
holistic organization of a psychopathological condition, an adequate understanding of the 
condition still requires detailed analyses of the structural features involved in the gestalt shift, or 
what Parnas refers to as part-whole interactions. Dimensional approaches distinguish these 
structural features, and can provide a framework of the various elements that should be 
considered when articulating and describing an overall gestalt shift. Reciprocally, clarifying the 
gestalt or organizing principle of a condition might supply hypotheses for further dimensional 
research. For example, if a subject’s condition seems to involve a general lowering or 
diminishing of affective intensity or attunement, a dimensionally oriented researcher might 
hypothesize similar kinds of changes in perception (e.g. lowered intensity of tactile sensation, or 
diminished response to stimuli), thereby guiding research into another domain of human 
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existence. Furthermore the results of such an investigation can confirm or disconfirm initial 
claims about the changes involved in a particular kind of gestalt shift. 
Second, if phenomenologists aim to discover a core disturbance, or a fundamental 
alteration that brings about the other aspects of the condition, a dimensional approach can 
delineate and isolate possible candidates. A good example of this approach is found in Merleau-
Ponty’s study of Schneider, a World War I veteran who underwent dramatic changes in his 
perception and motility following a brain injury (Merleau-Ponty, 2012). In the course of his 
investigation, Merleau-Ponty seeks out a core disturbance that makes sense of the complex and 
varied layers of Schneider’s condition, and he draws considerable influence from the gestalt 
psychologists. However, in order to make sense of this gestalt and isolate the core disturbance, 
he moves between discussions of the overall organization of Schneider’s condition and detailed 
investigations of specific elements, such as motility, vision, touch, and projection. He begins by 
proposing a hypothesis, stipulating a core disturbance at the heart of Schneider’s condition. He 
then investigates various aspects of Schneider’s condition in order to assess whether their 
alteration might be explained by appealing to his earlier hypothesis. When this stipulated core 
disturbance cannot explain one or more aspects of Schneider’s condition, he proposes a new 
hypothesis, stipulating a different core disturbance, and so on and so forth. Throughout his study, 
he moves between a core gestalt approach, seeking out a fundamental disturbance, and 
something not unlike a dimensional approach, investigating distinct structural elements of 
Schneider’s condition in order to test whether these changes can be made sense of within the 
overall framework he has sketched. 
While my own proposal may not require that a phenomenologist move between the core 
gestalt and dimensional approaches as freely as Merleau-Ponty, his method at least offers an 
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example of how such approaches might be complementary and mutually informative. When 
conducted on a larger scale, dimensionally orientated investigations can shed much needed light 
on specific facets of psychopathological conditions, providing resources for the 
phenomenological study of core gestalts. 
In light of these examples, it is not only clear that a phenomenological-dimensional 
approach can complement and support a core gestalt approach—it is also clear that a 
phenomenological-dimensional approach need not subscribe to an atomistic characterization of 
the structural features of human subjectivity. Conceptually distinguishing domains and 
dimensions of human subjectivity as a guide for phenomenological research does not entail that 
these domains and dimensions are separate from each other, or otherwise unrelated to a 
holistically organized subjectivity. 
Conclusion: The Future of Phenomenological Psychopathology 
  While the dominant approach to psychiatric diagnosis and classification remains 
categorial, the current DSM categories have not been validated. They do not supply adequate 
guides for predicting course of illness or treatment response, or guiding neurobiological research. 
In light of this crisis in contemporary psychiatry, dimensional approaches have been put forward 
as a viable alternative for psychiatric research and classification. Such approaches relieve certain 
question begging constraints imposed by the use of invalid diagnostic categories as a framework 
for cutting edge research. By orienting a research program through dimensions rather than 
preliminary categories, studies can address variations and disturbances across the full range of 
psychopathological conditions.  
In following with these new developments in the field of psychiatry, I have considered 
the possibility of phenomenological psychopathologists orienting their own research through a 
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broadly dimensional framework. While the RDoC does not adequately accommodate a 
phenomenological approach, I have argued that phenomenologists organize their research along 
dimensional lines by relying on their own conceptual distinctions among the basic existentials, or 
constitutive features of human existence. In addition, I have drawn on recent phenomenological 
studies with broadly dimensional orientations in order to illustrate how such an approach can cut 
across diagnostic boundaries or tease apart the heterogeneity of conditions enveloped by a single 
category. Finally, I have argued that a phenomenological-dimensional approach need not conflict 
with the more traditional and currently dominant core gestalt approach. In fact, the two 
approaches are in many ways complementary and mutually supportive. 
Whether psychiatry will ultimately adopt a dimensional system of classification remains 
to be seen. Nevertheless, dimensional approaches are already being employed in contemporary 
psychiatric research, and clearly offer a viable alternative to categorially oriented research 
programs. Insofar as phenomenologists are concerned with maintaining interdisciplinary 
dialogue and potentially collaborating with psychiatric researchers, it would be prudent to 
develop a broadly dimensional outlook—even if it differs in important respects from what is 
currently used in mainstream psychiatry. Employing similar approaches reduces the barriers to 
interdisciplinary dialogue and collaboration, increasing the potential for phenomenological 
research to make its way into mainstream psychiatry, ultimately influencing the course of 
psychiatric research and practice. 
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1 For an introduction and critical analysis of typification and ideal types in psychiatric diagnosis 
and classification, see Fernandez (forthcoming a). 
2 Parnas and Zahavi (2002) have also proposed an ideal types approach. However, their approach 
differs from the one proposed by Schwartz, Wiggins, and Norko insofar as it aims to clarify the 
essential features that must hold for a condition to count as belonging to the category question. 
3 Some of these constitutive features are listed and briefly defined in a chapter on 
phenomenology and psychiatric classification by Parnas and Zahavi (2002). However, while they 
do distinguish some of these basic features of subjectivity, they do not propose anything akin to a 
dimensional approach.  
4 Genetic phenomenology, introduced by Husserl, is the phenomenological study of the temporal 
genesis and unfolding. It investigates necessary laws of temporality as well as contingent 
development (e.g. in cases of psychopathology). For a more detailed account of genetic 
phenomenology’s role in psychopathology, see Sass (2010). 
